In what follows I will join the few dissenters and argue that this principle of unrestricted composition is not necessarily true. If I am right, it follows that either some principle of restricted composition is necessarily true or the existence of composite objects is a contingent matter. I will end by indicating why the latter option seems the most plausible.
3
I proceed by reductio. Assume the following:
(1) Unrestricted composition is necessarily true.
That is, assume that necessarily, any collection of things composes something. Then, necessarily, the collection of everything composes something. That is, necessarily, there exists a universal object U having all things as parts, not itself being a proper part of anything. Hence, by our assumption, we get:
(2) There must be a universal object U.
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It is important to note that this is so whether the world is finite or infinite.
Holding that in worlds of finite cardinality there is a universal object U while in worlds of infinite cardinality there is no universal object U amounts to accepting a restricted form of composition.
4
Now consider the following scenario. Everything in this world is spatially extended and just one half of something else that is also spatially extended. That is, for any thing in this world, there is something else of which it is a spatial proper part. Or consider this scenario. Our universe is a miniature replica universe housed in a particle of a bigger replica universe, which is again a miniature replica universe housed in a particle of an even bigger replica universe, and so on ad infinitum. Conceiving of these scenarios amounts to conceiving of worlds in which everything is a proper part. Let's call such worlds, junky worlds. Official definition: world w is junky ¼ df anything in w is a proper part.
5
Having thus conceived of junky worlds, we seem provided with some prima facie reasons to think such worlds are possible. I am of course not alone in thinking so. For example, early Leibniz thought the material world was junky:
For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power. (Leibniz 1698: 162) 6 Later Leibniz is even clearer about this:
. . . for there is never an infinite whole in the world, though there are always wholes greater than others ad infinitum. As I have shown elsewhere, the universe itself cannot be considered to be a whole. (Leibniz 1996: 151) Another prominent proponent of the possibility of junky worlds is Alfred North Whitehead. His second mereological axiom of events reads: 'Every event extends over other events and is itself part of other events', where 'part' here means 'proper part ' (1919: 101) and 'x extends over y' means that y is a proper part of x. According to Peter Simons, 'that the world is ''open'' both above and below seems to have been something which Whitehead found self-evident, for he gives no argument for it ' (1987:83). 7 Note also that the idea of a junky world is logically consistent in the sense that there are junky models of many non-classical mereologies.
8 That is, there are no logical contradictions lurking in the background.
But if we can conceive of junky worlds, and several prominent philosophers have taken the idea seriously, and there are no logical contradictions lurking, then we are hard pressed to deny the mere possibility of the world being junky.
9 Hence:
(3) The world might be junky.
Note that a junky world w cannot contain a universal object U because if it did there would exist something at w that was not a proper part of anything, namely U, and that would contradict the world's being junky. Thus, in order for the world to be junky, it cannot contain U, but rather an infinite plurality of objects such that each thing in the plurality is a proper part of something else in the plurality. Hence, by (3), we get:
(4) There might not be a universal object U.
But (2) and (4) is a contradiction. Hence, (1) must be false. Unrestricted composition is not necessarily true.
10
There are three ways to go from here, the first two of which seem less plausible. First, one might attempt to argue directly against (3) by trying to come up with reasons that trump the above justifications for it. I don't have space to discuss all such attempts here, but I merely note that I doubt there will be a non-question begging way of doing this.
11 Second, one might simply accept the necessary truth of some principle or other of restricted composition compatible with (3). The following principle seems to be the most 7 Whitehead too is thus thinking of a hunky world. But again, hunk implies junk. 9 I have adopted this three-step test for possibility from Schaffer 2003. 10 Note that (2) is a logical consequence of (1) while (4) is a logical consequence of (3), so the only option for resistance amounts to denying (1) or (3).
simple, intuitive, and plausible such candidate: necessarily, all and only finite pluralities compose something. That means that if the world is finite, it contains a universal object U, while if the world is infinite with mereological atoms, it is junky. The problem with this principle is that it is incompatible with the world being gunky. A gunky world is such that everything in it has a proper part. If everything in the world has a proper part, then every fusion in the world is infinitely divisible, 12 which means that every fusion in the world is of infinite cardinality, which again means that no fusion in the world is of finite cardinality. Since our principle implies that necessarily all fusions are of finite cardinality, it must therefore be incompatible with the possibility of gunk. But that the world might be gunky is plausible for very similar reasons it is plausible that the world might be junky. 13 Hence, our justification for (3) seems to preclude the necessity of the above principle of restricted composition. And as far as I can tell there is no other necessary and sufficient principle of restricted composition compatible with (3) that is even remotely plausible as a necessary truth.
14 It thus seems more plausible to go down the third and final route: conclude that which fusions exist and which don't is a contingent matter, varying from world to world.
